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1 Introduction  
Throughout history, people have lived together in relationships with elements of love, sex, friendship 
and the goal of procreation. Relationships can be shaped in many ways. The extent to which the 
couple allow for legal interference varies from the contract-free relationship on one side of the 
spectrum and marriage on the other side.  
Marriage is still popular, but it has lost its legitimising character with regard to the begetting of 
children; statistics show that in 2015 more than one out of two eldest children were born outside 
marriage, against one out of thirty in the sixties.1 In several Western countries, a lot of benefits in 
relation to parental status, child care, social support, inheritance and tax, once only available for 
married couples, are also available for cohabitants; actually to such an extent that in normal daily life 
the distinction between married and unmarried couples is often hard to detect.  
Although the differences in treatment between marriage and unmarried cohabitation have 
decreased over the last decades, there still are some striking benefits and burdens connected to 
marriage, even after it has been dissolved.2 Marriage is like a gate to a different country: after 
passing it, the legal framework of the former country is replaced by a new one. And there is no way 
back: once married, always married, as your status will never again be unmarried; marriage only 
opens up to the statuses of married, divorced or widow/er. The legal framework is most visible when 
the marriage ends.3 Divorcing is not as easy as getting married, because some intervention of legal 
professionals and the court is always necessary, even when there is no conflict. Moreover, some 
rules remain in force, even after divorce: for example the exposure for certain debts of the other 
spouse survives dissolution, as well as the mutual responsibility for financial support, if needed and 
possible.4  
For the last thirty years, the popularity of marriage seems to be slowly in decline while the 
preference for (unregulated) cohabitation5 and registered partnership6 rises. Reasons for the decline 
may be the high rate of divorces (37%) or that the mandatory legal framework fails to adapt to the 
demands of the new generations. It may also be that intervention of the court is obligatory, which 
makes a dissolution, especially a divorce, more complicated than a breakup outside marriage; the 
regulations also result in an unequal treatment of relationships in relation to their format which 
needs to be clarified and explained. 
Against this background, I would like to investigate the justification for the binding marriage laws and 
the barriers they present to complete dissolution. Marriage is regulated in general and the provisions 
 
1 Actually 52% of the eldest children, https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2016/21/ouders-van-ruim-vier-op-de-
tien-baby-s-niet-getrouwd,  https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2001/09/steeds-meer-kinderen-buiten-huwelijk-
geboren. 
2 Divorce is no longer connected with fault or breach but with breakdown, which makes the term cancellation 
more suitable. But I will continue to use dissolve and dissolution because these are customary.    
3 Relations have become less stable over the years, so this happens more often, Te Riele, Saskia (2019), 
Opvattingen over trouwen, samenwonen en scheiden, Den Haag, CBS Statistische trends, p. 10. 
4 In 2018 37% of the marriages ended by divorce, 63% by death. About 14% of the divorces was not amicably 
settled, https://www.wodc.nl/binaries/FS%202019-1_tcm28-390997.pdf. 
5 The popularity of marriage (registered partnership included) falls steadily: 9,5 (per 1000 inhabitants) in 1970 
to 4,85 (per 1000 inhabitants) in 2018, 
https://opendata.cbs.nl/statline/?dl=1FD20#/CBS/nl/dataset/37772ned/table; unmarried cohabitation has 
become more popular, https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2018/18/twintigers-en-dertigers-trouwen-minder. 
6 The popularity of the registered partnership is but rising, at the cost of marriage: 4.600 : 92.900 (1998), 6.300 
: 75.700 (2005), 9.400 : 64.500 (2013), 19.800 : 64.300 (2018), https://www.cbs.nl/nl-
nl/nieuws/2019/25/opnieuw-meer-partnerschapsregistraties 
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regarding its dissolution represent a special and typical part of these marriage laws. The aim of this 
thesis is to find an answer to the question: what justifies the barriers to complete dissolution? In 
order to find out, I will have to look into the justification for the binding character of marriage law in 
general, because any arguments that support a barrier to dissolution should be connected to the goal 
of general interference in marriage in the first place.  
This thesis is structured as follows: chapter 2 presents both a short introduction to marriage and its 
different aspects, as a summary of the main features of marriage. Chapter 3 is the chapter that lays 
the groundwork for the understanding and assessment of the arguments regarding justification in 
chapter 4. In chapter 3, I will try to find out what is viewed as the origin of the public interest in 
marriage through time and, if there is any, what then the justification is for government interference 
resulting in a binding framework upon and even beyond dissolution. This chapter shows the 
evolution of the arguments for and against government interference in marriage, including imposing 
regulation regarding its dissolubility. With this groundwork in mind, chapter 4 focuses on the 
assessment of the several arguments. I will do so in the context of the question whether the interest 
and justifications provide sufficient ground for the mandatory legal intervention and barriers to 
(complete) dissolution of marriage, as opposed to the unregulated (process of) dissolubility of 
relationships outside marriage. In this context, two aspects of divorce will be distinguished (a) the 
formal aspect of obligatory court intervention and (b) the material aspect of the extended property 
effects beyond dissolution. Chapter 5 contains the conclusion. 
My hypothesis is that the justification given for the barriers to dissolution, that are part of the 
binding framework, may not be sufficient. Therefore, I will conclude that the current legal framework 
needs adaption and should at least partially be stripped of its binding character.  
As far as certain practices are taken into account, these regard the situation in the Netherlands, 
though the considerations and conclusions of this thesis may be applicable to other situations.  
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2 The main features of marriage 
The choice for marriage has legal consequences that result in a different legal treatment of the 
relationship in otherwise similar situations. 
Living together 
In cases where partners are not bound by marriage, the end of their commitment results in an 
unregulated breakup; it may have consequences for children, or legal consequences that follow from 
the choice for joint ownership or other arrangements, but the breakup itself is not specifically 
regulated by law. Free relationships are characterized by the fact that there is no government 
interference beyond normal contract law. The freedom of contract7 allows the couple to reach 
consensus during and after their relationship on the terms of their breakup and the division of 
property as they wish. Examination or verification of their settlement by a third party that represents 
society is unnecessary. Their relationship is considered as a private matter, although it is in many 
ways, for example with respect to social welfare and tax regulations, equated with marriage.  
The institution of matrimony 
The married couple find themselves in a different situation. By marrying, the couple express their 
mutual love, commitment and loyalty towards each other. But they also enter in a publicly 
recognized institution associated with constituting a family and in the social and legal framework that 
is connected with it. For those who combine the civil with a religious ceremony, there is also the 
religious element of marriage. Martha Nussbaum indicates these three elements as the expressive, 
civil rights and religious aspects, before concluding that government plays a key role in all three of 
them.8 
Marriage is thus not just a private matter, but also a public matter and government takes it upon 
itself to regulate it. It is regulated by definition. If the couple do not agree on a certain property 
division, the limited community of goods automatically applies. Freedom of contract is restricted, 
because they can neither easily change their property regime, nor exclude for example partner 
alimony after divorce. Other mandatory laws concern for example: access to the institution of 
matrimony, relation with respect to the religious marriage, duties between the spouses, the status in 
relation to children and other relatives; joint liability for certain debts; (access to) financial and other 
support, pensions and public assistance and the status in court (spouses are not under obligation to 
testify against each other). Further, if the couple decide to terminate their marriage, the Law 
stipulates intervention of third parties representing society (lawyers and a court), with the 
accompanying costs and administrative bother. And last but not least, if a marriage ends in a divorce, 
the status quo is partially maintained: financial ties are not severed, as demonstrated by the liability 
for certain debts and the entitlement to financial support of the spouse who lacks the financial 
resources that the other would be able supply.  
The couple are supposed to be acquainted with all these rules, that take effect immediately and 
automatically upon marriage, although in practice they often are not. So, by entering into marriage, 
the couple do more than demonstrating their wish to face the unknown future as a couple; they also 
invite society as an invisible third party at the table.  
 
7 Meaning that parties are free to decide what they contract about, as long as they observe general limitations, 
such as rules of public order. 
8 Nussbaum, Martha. C. (2010), A Right to marry, California Law Review, vol. 98, no. 3, (pp 667- 696), p. 669. 
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Taking into account all of the above, marriage seems both a private and a public matter. I would like 
to sum up the main features present in marriage today, compared to a relationship outside marriage, 
as follows: (i) the couple’s voluntary consent (ii) to a union that represents mutual commitment and 
loyalty, (iii) expressed in public9 and (iv) acceptance of a (possibly partly unknown) framework of 
mandatory laws (v) which even binds after dissolution of the marriage by – for example - divorce. It is 
the justification of the last two features, the extension of the binding regime upon dissolution, in this 
thesis limited to divorce, resulting in a partial indissolubility of the marriage, that will be the topic of 
further investigation.  
Registered partnership 
In name the registered partnerships resembles a partnership, but in fact it is almost as strictly 
regulated as marriage; it thus shares its features.10 It is established in 1998 to serve as the equivalent 
of matrimony for same sex couples. The main difference with marriage is that it can be dissolved 
outside court by mutual agreement, provided that the couple do not have the care for minor 
children. In the last years, the registered partnership becomes more and more appreciated.11 
Children are not a main feature 
Before continuing, I would like to explain why children are not regarded as a main feature of 
marriage. First, not all married couples have children. Second, because I focus on the justification of 
barriers to dissolution as a special form of interference in marriage, children only come up in case 
there is a difference in treatment of married couples and unmarried couples. As long as there is no 
difference, the justification for government intervention will not be discussed. In Western Europe the 
marital status of the parents as a couple does no longer exclusively affect the position of parents and 
children as it used to do. True, a child that is born outside marriage12 has automatically only one 
parent, the mother, while the child born within wedlock has automatically two parents with 
authority over the child. But it is quite easy to establish the other parent’s parenting and authority, 
so the importance of the automatic parenthood has diminished. Other differences have vanished: 
children are entitled to maintenance, whether they are born in or outside marriage, even when the 
status of biological parent has not been formalized into legal parent. And parents in and outside 
marriage can equally benefit from social and tax benefits related to children.13 Summarizing, 
government interference with regard to children exists in and outside marriage and children do not 
need a marriage to be born or to be assured of parental care and marriage does not need children to 
exist. They will therefore be discussed where of interest, but not as a main feature. 
 
9 Public refers to the presence of the official of the civil registry, who represents the community. This is a 
constitutive element of marriage and therefore a feature. 
10 During the ceremony in presence of an official of the civil registry, the consent is given in writing, by a 
signature, not by stating yes. 
11 Note 6. 
12 In this respect marriage and registered partnership have equal consequences: since 2014  also children born 
in a registered partnership automatically have two parents. 
13 Te Riele, Saskia (2019), p. 5 and 10. 
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3 What interest does society have in marriage? 
Throughout history marriage has been encouraged, protected and regulated by those in power; in 
western Europe once the (Catholic) Church and later the public government. In this chapter I will 
investigate why marriage was deemed of public interest and how laws regarding its content and 
dissolution were justified. Several views will be discussed and contrasted with each other. Some 
arguments for the special treatment of marriage, and for its (in)dissolubility, expressed in the 
different views, are still relevant. They resonate in the current laws and legislative history, with 
reference to for example the obligations to raise the minors that are part of the family, the ‘special 
bond’ and the prolonged solidarity between the spouses. These arguments will be investigated in this 
chapter and then serve, alone or combined, as a basis for the general assessment of the justification 
of the barriers to dissolubility of marriage in chapter 4.  
3.1 The Catholic view challenged – Thomas Aquinas and Martin Luther 
3.1.1 Thomas Aquinas and the canonical law 
In the Middle Ages, religion, especially the Roman Catholic faith, exercised a major influence on life 
in Western Europe. In the Roman Catholic view, which relied on the Bible, marriage is a natural14 and 
indissoluble bond between man and woman as well as one of the seven sacraments. This twofold 
character is brought forward as justification for interference by the religious society and its sole 
jurisdiction.  
An important element of the Roman Catholic view, is that access to marriage is limited. Even though 
marriage may be considered as necessary for procreation and holy, it is deemed less important than 
the spiritual bond with God. This bond is best served by celibacy, and this is the reason for the 
clergy’s prohibition to marry. Nevertheless, the interest of society, or even mankind, is connected 
with the goal of marriage. Referring to Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) mentions explicitly as 
principal end of matrimony ‘the good of the offspring’, which he understands as the begetting and 
educating of children, as well as the ‘mutual services which married persons render one another in 
household matters.’ As man is not self-sufficient in life, and thus inclined to organise himself in 
society, nature dictates that man and woman organise themselves in matrimony.15 
According to Aquinas, matrimony is also a sacrament, a spiritual bonding, as ‘the effect of the Divine 
power by means of material joining,’16 or a sign of the unison with God. So matrimony is holy and 
everlasting and subject to divine law17 as the couple are joined together by their consent to the union 
with God. Because of this connection with divine law, the interest and legislation regarding 
matrimony belongs exclusively to the one and only institution that can interpret, explain and thus 
safeguard compliance with the divine law: the Catholic Church.  
The doctrine is clear about divorce: it is impossible. As God is deemed to play an active role in the 
union, it is not up to man to dissolve it; Aquinas emphasizes: ‘the indissolubility of marriage belongs 
to the truth of life’.18 But the strict position on indissolubility poses practical problems, as the life on 
 
14 Marriage is of natural law, Aquinas, Thomas (1265), Summa Theologiae, Suppl., published at 
documentacatholicaomnia.eu, question 41 (1). 
15 Aquinas, Thomas, question 41 (1). 
16 Aquinas, Thomas, question 45 (1). 
17 Aquinas, Thomas, question 47 (3). 
18 Aquinas, Thomas, question 53 (2). Divorce differs from annulment because of an impediment: impediments 
to marriage were for example consanguinity, impotence or previous madness. Impediments prevent a valid 
consent to the conjugal union, thus resulting in a null and void marriage from the start. 
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earth does not reflect the divine law. Putting the Bible into practice, in the Middle Ages and onward, 
the ecclesial courts used to grant bed-and-board divorces, meaning that the spouses were no longer 
under obligation to live together. But the marriage remained intact, meaning that the man had to 
continue to support his wife. As the man gained not only full possession of the wife’s property 
through marriage, but the wife was also unable to act on her own behalf or provide for herself, this is 
a logical consequence of the regime. She was placed under authority of the man and would be 
without means if the man did not support her.19 This is the origin of the maintenance obligations. 
Today, the indissolubility of marriage is still defended from the Catholic point of view; its 
indissolubility should even be considered as the essential property of marriage; as a consequence 
divorce is immoral, as Schulz puts it.20 The vow that constitutes marriage differs essentially from the 
promise or contract, because ‘vows have no temporal conditions of satisfaction’, in other words: a 
vow is future-proof, never-ending and it cannot be undone, just dishonoured.21 By the vow the 
members of the couple become family of the other, with the associated reciprocal obligations on 
either side; a result a mere contract can never achieve.22 It does not prevent people from seeking the 
Church’s permission to separate, as the more frequent appeal on annulment shows.23 
3.1.2 From the religious society to secular government – Martin Luther 
When Martin Luther (1483-1546) enters the world stage, marriage is in a state of crisis. The Catholic 
doctrine about marriage and it its indissolubility does neither prevent a practice of ‘second’ 
marriages nor that marriage itself becomes a source of conflict and litigation.24 By rejecting 
dissolution and its emphasis on celibacy, the Catholic doctrine has - in Luther’s view - only 
encouraged outburst and indulgence such as adultery, in other word, merely invited ‘unchaste 
thoughts and evil lust’.25 
Luther rejects the interpretation of the religious aspects of marriage offered by the Catholic Church, 
by denying that marriage was a sacrament26 and emphasizing the aspects of procreation and 
fidelity.27 Consequently, the basis for the Church’s role as the sole interpreter and legislator to 
safeguard compliance with the divine law is eradicated, at least for those who do not support the 
Catholic interpretation. Luther’s emphasis on faith, and the individual and unmediated spiritual bond 
with God, leads him to value celibacy and marriage as equally spiritual and noble states.28 As a result, 
the ground for celibacy is eradicated too.  
Luther holds that, although matrimony is created for man, it has to be shaped by man: it is both a 
divine as well as a worldly and temporal affair.29 Because of man’s natural drive to procreate, man 
 
19 Ploscowe, Morris (1969), Alimony, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 
383, May, pp. 13-22, p. 16; Lettmaier, Saskia (2017), Marriage Law and the Reformation, Law and History 
Review, Vol. 35 (2), 498. 
20 Schulz, Joshua (2012), Indissoluble Marriage, A Defense, Logos 15:2, p. 118. 
21 Schulz, Joshua, p. 124. 
22 Schulz, Joshua, p. 126. 
23 For example: since 2015 it is possible to request the bishop to annul the marriage. 
24 O’Reggio, Trevor (2012), p. 212-213. 
25 O’Reggio, Trevor (2012), p. 203 en 209. 
26 Important argument was that the Bible does not stipulate that marriage is one of the sacraments, Buitendag, 
Johan (2009), Marriage in the theology of Martin Luther – worldly yet sacred: An option between secularism 
and clericalism, Theological Studies 63 (2), p. 449. 
27 Luther is inspired by Augustine and bases his view (a.o.) on the translation of the Greek word mysterion; it 
should have been translated as mystery instead of sacrament, O’Reggio, Trevor (2012), p. 204. 
28 O’Reggio, Trevor (2012), p. 207. 
29 Lettmaier, Saskia (2017), 477, O’Reggio, Trevor (2012), p. 203 
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will be inclined to lead a sinful life, not aimed at fidelity, but roam freely or be promiscuous.30 He 
thus especially honours matrimony as the protection against sin and as the signpost on the way to a 
faithful life.31 The ground for legal interference then is not, as in the Catholic view, the compliance 
with the divine law, but the appreciation of marriage as a necessary institution that enables a morally 
acceptable life on earth. It is up to man (the civil authorities) to design the laws on earth - within the 
context of the New Testament of course - and with the teachings of Christ serving as instructions for 
ethical use of these.32 
The reinstitution of morality is the incentive for the reform and revaluation of marriage, as a result 
whereof divorce and remarriage become possible. Luther advocates that deserted spouses can 
remarry after five years of absence of the other spouse,33 and that divorce in full is possible for 
example in case of adultery,34 which is punishable by death. He thus allows not only a bed-and-board 
divorce, but also the not guilty party to remarry.35 Luther distinguishes between the guilty and the 
innocent party in a divorce, a distinction that gains relevance over the years. 
The ideas of the Reformation eventually lead to a division of public and religious matters. Public 
matters were to be regulated by the government and religious matters by the Church. But the 
release from the fixed religious doctrine creates a slippery slope in a search for the grounds for and 
extent of legal interference in marriage.  
3.2 Natural law, the contract and marriage 
 
3.2.1 Samuel von Pufendorf 
In the 17th century, influenced by Humanism and the early trend of Enlightenment, thinkers tend to 
seek a general and rational instead of dogmatic and religious stance towards man and his 
relationships, whether they existed on the level of the government, other individuals or the family. 
Many philosophers, such as Grotius, Hobbes, Spinoza and Pufendorf reflected on man’s natural state; 
hypothetically speaking, as we will never actually find ourselves in such a state. The values of 
marriage, noted by Augustine and emphasized by Luther, remain procreation and fidelity, as 
demonstrated by successive accounts of marriage by for example Grotius and Pufendorf. However, 
the ideas on marriage develop further and the concept of sin with respect to marriage seems to 
transform into a more neutral morality. I will elaborate on Samuel von Pufendorf (1632-1694) as he 
devotes relatively much attention to marriage.  
In Of the Law of Nature and Nations (1672), he connects man’s sociable nature to his self-
preservation. Man’s peaceful sociability is a disposition to unite, to be part of a community, under a 
common rule.36 The law of nature is a set of moral rules that supports this disposition; they act as 
principles of justice, independent of and superseding the positive law in a society, ‘to which political 
enactments should always correspond, and which they never must transgress,’ in a direct or indirect 
way.37  
 
30 Buitendag, Johan (2009), p. 455; O’Reggio, Trevor (2012), p. 207. 
31 Buitendag, Johan (2009), p. 454 and 455. 
32 Lettmaier, Saskia (2017), p. 475-476, 505. 
33 Lettmaier, Saskia (2017), p. 487. 
34 Buitendag, Johan (2009), p. 449; Lettmaier, Saskia (2017), p. 474. 
35 Lettmaier, Saskia (2017), p. 488 
36 Pufendorf, Samuel (1672), Of the Law of Nature and Nations, transl. Kennett, Basil, London, published at 
archive.org, Book II, Chapter III.15 (p. 136-137) and with reference to Seneca on p. 138. 
37 Wokler, Robert, Garsten, Bryan (2012), Rousseau, the Age of Enlightenment and Their Legacies, Chapter 6 
Rousseau’s Pufendorf: Natural Law and the Foundations of Commercial Society, Princeton, Princeton University 
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Pufendorf also applies the natural law to marriage and argues that the purpose of marriage is linked 
to the founding and subsistence of society. As God gave ‘the two different sexes (…) the natural 
power of propagating their kind,’38 as well as the capability to passionately love their offspring, it is 
part of nature of man, or his instinct, to contribute to the preservation of the human race. Human 
society would no longer subsist, if man were free to pursue any amorous entertainment, no strings 
attached. As a result a child must be protected against, for example, disgrace of a mother, because 
disgrace may incite her to kill her child.39 So the conduct of man needs to be regulated, and marriage 
is the institution to do so.  
Pufendorf further explains marriage in terms of a contract, in a way similar to the Hobbesian relation 
between the king and his subjects: submission and obedience of the woman in exchange for the 
man’s protection.40 The idea of man as master seems at odds with the idea of equality in the state of 
nature, but Pufendorf justifies this by a comparison to the organisation of the government. Consent 
of the woman and the custom that a state or a community regularly does not allow ‘more than one 
head’, are sufficient grounds.41  
A mandatory framework of marital law is necessary, because unrestricted freedom could harm 
subsistence of society, thus it can be contrary to right reason.42 In the event that instinct contradicts 
reason, the latter must contain the first for example by matrimonial prescriptions:43  
 
…without matrimonial prescriptions we cannot well suppose any such thing as families, nor 
without families any public states; and since therefore the whole order and harmony of civil life 
is founded on these regulations, it is most clear that were men entirely releas’d from such 
bonds, they must live in an unsociable, separate condition, little better than brutal.44 
 
The Law needs to stipulate the rights and duties connected with marriage.45 But other duties and 
obligations, such as those regarding property, can be settled by marital agreements. With regard to 
these, the freedom of contract rules:46 
 
What power the husband hath over the goods of the wife, is likewise to be adjusted either by 
the contract or agreement of the parties, or by the decision of civil laws. These engagements 
are to be strictly obeyed in the several points which they have settled; as for instance whether 
the woman shall bring a portion at marriage; whether or not the couple shall join purses, and 
mix their effects in the common stock, whether the husband shall have an absolute or limited 
disposal of his wife’s fortune; and the like questions. 
 
 
Press, p. 89; Seidler, Michael (2015), Pufendorf’s Moral and Political Philosophy, published at Stanford 
Encyclopedia, par. 3.5 Types of Duties.  
38 Seidler, Michael (2015), par. 2. 
39 Seidler, Michael (2015), par. 3, p. 561, barrenness should not raise any scruple, as man has tried his best. 
40 Pufendorf, Samuel (1672), VI.1.11 (p. 570). 
41 But he distinguishes the end of both (procreation versus security), Pufendorf, Samuel (1672),  VI.1.11 (p. 
570). 
42 Pufendorf, Samuel (1672), VI.1.4 (p. 562). 
43 Pufendorf, Samuel (1672), VI.1.3 (p. 561). 
44 Pufendorf, Samuel (1672), VI.1.5 (p. 562). 
45 Pufendorf, Samuel (1672), VI.1.5 and 8 (pp. 562 and 566). 
46 Pufendorf, Samuel (1672), VI.1.11 (p. 571). 
11 
 
The tradition of natural law also rethought the indissolubility of marriage as established by canonical 
law. Finding no rational source to uphold the religious view,47 Pufendorf explicitly asks himself 
whether natural law allows for dissolution of the partnership and a divorce. His response takes into 
account several sources, but the principles of contract law seem to be the most important: he notes 
that, as with regular covenants, unilateral termination of the union is generally only possible in cases 
of breach of the agreement, as for example adultery.48 This reminds of the notion of guilt that is 
mentioned in Luther’s account, in a refined and contractual disguise.  
 
3.2.2 John Locke 
 
John Locke (1632-1704) also subscribed to the point of view, that thinking about man and his relation 
in society can be based on the assumption of a hypothetical state of nature, where men are equal. 
However, he develops his ideas about marriage against the background of liberty, regarding the 
notions of consent and contract at a more substantive level.  
Locke discusses conjugal society before going into civil and political society, which may be taken as 
an indication of his idea that the conjugal society precedes the civil society. This is still in line with 
Pufendorf’s view that marriage is a founding element of society. But in his Second Treatise of 
Government Locke infers an original conclusion from this:49 
For all the ends of marriage being to be obtained under politick government, as well as in the 
state of nature, the civil magistrate doth not abridge the right, or power of either naturally 
necessary to those ends, viz. procreation and mutual support and assistance whilst they are 
together; but only decides any controversie that may arise between man and wife about them. 
Public government is not necessary to allow marriage fulfil its purpose, which is procreation and the 
continuation of the species; this purpose can be fulfilled in the state of nature as well. He then goes 
beyond Pufendorf in the conclusions he draws from the consent and the purpose of marriage, stating 
that: 50 
Conjugal society is made by a voluntary compact between man and woman: and (…) it consists 
chiefly in such a communion and right in one anothers bodies, as is (…) necessary to their 
common offspring, who have right to be nourished and maintained by them, till they are able 
to provide for themselves. […It] ought to last, even after procreation, so long as is necessary to 
the nourishment and support of the young ones.  
By the last subclause, Locke relates the consent to the special purpose of marriage and specifies that 
there will be a moment in time when the purpose of marriage is fulfilled, as children will grow up and 
leave the nest. He notes that ‘parents have a sort of rule and jurisdiction over them when they come 
into the world, and for some time after, but ‘tis but a temporary one’.51 The exemption to the rule are 
‘lunatics and idiots’, who will always remain under rule of their parents, because they cannot be 
guided by understanding or reason.52 By regarding marriage as a voluntary compact, as an expression 
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48 Pufendorf, Samuel (1672),  VI.1.20, p. 579, 580; in marriage the parties have given each other a right over 
each other’s bodies, which should not be taken from them against their will. 
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51 Locke, John (1689), II:55. 
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of the free will, for limited purposes, Locke draws attention to the freedom of the spouses. Society 
has an interest in marriage for its purpose, but not beyond it. Therefore, Locke highlights the need 
for parents to stay together during the upbringing,53 but suggests they are free after that. It seems he 
even suggests the possibility of serial monogamy, because there is no reason not to bond again, with 
someone else, once a marriage has fulfilled its purpose:54 
Long before a human child is able to shift for itself without help from his parents, its mother 
can again conceive and bear another child; so that the father, who is bound to take care for 
those he has fathered, is obliged to continue in conjugal society with the same woman for 
longer than some other creatures. …. But though there are these ties that make conjugal bonds 
firmer and more lasting in humans than in the other species of animals, it is still reasonable to 
ask: Once procreation and upbringing have been secured, and inheritance arranged for, why 
shouldn’t this compact between man and wife be like any other voluntary compact? That is, 
why shouldn’t its continuance depend on the consent of the parties, or on the elapsing of a 
certain period of time, or on some other condition? It is a reasonable question because neither 
the compact itself or the purposes for which it was undertaken require that it should always be 
for life.  
Locke indicates that divorce is possible upon unilateral withdrawal of the consent. From this can be 
inferred that Locke’s starting point is that complete dissolution of the marriage is possible and 
regulated by the terms of the marital agreements, after the task of raising the children has been 
fulfilled.55 It seems that for Locke the purpose of marriage may concur with, but is not identical to the 
content regulated by the marital agreements. The liberty of man, manifest in the freedom of 
contract, allows the couple to regulate the rights to property and the division of assistance and 
maintenance by the marital contract, as long as this does not violate the purpose of matrimony:56  
Community of Goods, and the power over them, mutual assistance, and maintenance, and 
other things belonging to conjugal society, might be varied and regulated by contract, which 
unites man and wife in that society, as far as may consist with procreation and the bringing up 
of children till they could shift for themselves; nothing being necessary to any society, that is 
not necessary to the ends for which it is made. 
The interference of government or a civil magistrate comes up when there are controversies over the 
contract to decide upon, to offer some kind of dispute resolution. Locke does not explicitly justify 
why government should even be implied in case of controversies about the marriage contract or its 
purpose. I gather that the justification for this interference must be sought in the purpose of the 
state, to offer security and preserve the property of members of society, who have given up their 
natural power to do so and judge their own case. As a result, the government must support conflict 
resolution between citizens by setting up an authority to appeal to. Such dispute resolution would 
then not be specific legal interference regarding marriage, but a general provision for all.57  
An upshot from Locke’s account is that he sets up a minimum and maximum bar for government to 
interfere. The minimum flows from the end of the state, meaning that it is under obligation to offer 
protection of property, on the basis of the arrangements made by the spouses. The government does 
so by offering dispute resolution. The purpose of matrimony also sets a bar to the maximum of legal 
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intervention: if the legislative or executive powers of the government go beyond that what is 
necessary to the end and purpose of matrimony, it is unnecessary and constitutes an unjustified 
infringement upon the liberty of man. It is then the contract between man and wife that is decisive 
for their division of powers and rights.  
Locke’s account is equally moralistic as his predecessors in his focus on the couple as the most 
favourable environment to raise children. But it differs fundamentally from the sin- or guilt-related 
account of his predecessors by his recognition that without prolonged consent, the basis for a 
relationships may be expired.  
3.2.3 Immanuel Kant 
In Locke’s contractual view free will and consent are important. These elements seem also present in 
the view of marriage proposed by Kant (1724-1804). But in addition, Kant introduces a universal 
moral rule, as a basic rule of humanity. As a result thereof, his notion of marriage is different. 
In his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) Kant explains how morality in the form of 
good will is founded in man, with good will being an end in itself, not means to an end.58 Good will 
thus has intrinsic value and we apply it easily by asking ourselves what to do, followed by assessing 
whether the maxim of our proposed action could be adopted as universal rule.59 Taken into account 
this moral principle, sexual relations are highly problematic. Kant’s main concern is that it would 
violate humanity if sexual relations, or the institution of marriage, were built on a relation between a 
man and a woman as means to each other’s end, to satisfy desire or acquire what they want, instead 
of treating the other as an end in itself.60  
The inclination for sexual intercourse is part of man’s nature. Kant’s contractual view of marriage 
serves the purpose of elevating sexuality out of immorality, which is more morally charged than ’the 
communion and right in one anothers bodies’ suggested by Locke.61  The technique Kant uses to 
achieve the intended role for the marriage contract is to contextualise it in a theory of property and 
right. In The Metaphysics of Morals (1797) in a separate section about a kind of property right on 
persons (a separate category invented by Kant)62 he lays emphasis on the elements of exchange and 
reciprocity, by the consent to marriage. The reason to connect the exchange with property, and not 
for example services, is that property can be owned and possessed, while service only gives right: the 
husband and wife gain possession of each other’s body, for the sake of sexual intercourse, thereby 
regaining possession of their own bodies.63 Because the exchange is mutual, it leads to equal 
possession of each other’s body: the woman that has given her body, gets the body of the man back 
in return, as well as her own body with it. According to Kant, sexual intercourse in this situation has 
lost its immoral character. It is therefore necessary to consider marriage as a contract, otherwise the 
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sexual relation cannot be considered as the ‘reciprocal use that one human being makes of the sexual 
organs and capacities of another.’64  
Kant dismisses Locke’s thoughts about freedom and possible dissolution after fulfilment of the 
purpose of the contract. He regards marriage not less than a lifelong and exclusive contract, though it 
could be more than that,65 but certainly not as a special purpose contract, that does not need to last 
after the task has been fulfilled. He proposes to regard procreation as a purpose of nature and not of 
marriage:  
The end of begetting and bringing up children may be an end of nature, for which it implanted 
inclination of the sexes for each other; but it is not a requisite for human beings who marry to 
make this their end in order for their union to be compatible with rights, for otherwise marriage 
would be dissolved when procreation ceases.66 
The reason for the indissolubility is probably that, once the sexual intercourse has taken place, it 
cannot be undone; it changes the situation of the woman irreversibly, while it leaves the man intact. 
The woman, whose body can be affected by sexual intercourse, especially when she produces 
children,67 gains a marriage contract that contains the obligation for the man to support her and any 
offspring, which makes the exchange a fair one. Dissolution would allow the moral issue, related with 
sexual intercourse and enjoyment, to enter the stage again, via the back door. The issue of pleasure 
and treating the women as means instead of an end in herself would return, thus forfeiting Kant’s 
purpose of marriage.  
Though it seems that the contractual element is the most important, and that any contract could 
achieve that, it is not possible to obtain the same result by a contract that is not a marriage contract. 
Only marriage can add the required moral value.68 Kant considers a relationship outside the marital 
bond, even if it is sealed by a contract, not as an exchange but a surrender of the woman to the man. 
Thus it is an immoral sexual relationship.69 Through his philosophy of right, Kant adds and applies his 
moral philosophy to marriage. In order to uphold the moral law, and thus promote and regulate 
marriage as the institution that serves the moral law by its key element of contractual exchange, 
government interference is necessary to allow for the step beyond a normal contract, by establishing 
and protecting the institution of marriage. His notion of the moral law grounds the indissolubility of 
marriage.  
3.3 The unity of matrimony – Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel 
The moral or ethical dimension of marriage is also emphasized by G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831). As Kant, 
Hegel rejects the mere procreational aspect of marriage as developed in the notion of natural law, 
but he opposes Kant’s contractual view on other grounds.  
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Hegel distinguishes between justification of something in itself and by appeal to circumstances of 
time and place.70 He argues that ethical love - to be distinguished from emotional love – is the 
essential element of marriage, which love needs no further justification because it grounds itself. 
Conditional for marriage is the equality of the partners. Both are free and equal to enter into 
marriage, as well as to terminate it.71 The marriage ceremony is a foundational and creative act,72 
aiming at the constitution and recognition of unity.73 The recognition, the core element of the 
ceremony, is twofold: it not only concerns the mutual recognition of the unity by the couple, by their 
expressed consent, but also a recognition of public society that witnesses this moment.74 This 
expressive aspect of marriage is important. The recognition creates a special sphere, where legality is 
kept at bay, because the daily relationship is a moral relationship, without ultimate authority and not 
guided by legal rules.75 Katz uses the appealing metaphor of a jazz-combo, playing without a strict 
scheme, proceeding by improvisation and mutual attunement.76 Public society is thus assigned the 
role to recognize the unity and treat the couple as one (combo), and the role of government is to 
render the legal framework for this recognition. 
In comparison with the views discussed until now, Hegel reverses the position of the married couple 
towards society, by emphasizing the fusion of two individuals into a unity that is to be recognized as 
a separate sphere in society, a sort of zone of non-interference. The family is constituted not of 
independent persons, but of members, who 'renounce their natural and individual personality to this 
unity.’ While Kant and Locke emphasize the individuality and the body, Hegel’s focus is on the 
dissolution of the personality and on the spiritual unity. This also has consequences for property; 
Hegel holds: ‘while no member of the family has property of his own, each has right in the common 
stock.’77 The recognition of the community entails that the unity in civil society is regarded as a single 
(legal) person, with its own sphere and property,78 represented by the husband, as he is the one 
partaking in civil society.79 Although property is important,80 Hegel dismisses Locke’s view that 
marriage is just an element of civil society, a contract for a certain purpose and regulating for 
example the right to property and other responsibilities.81 He also disagrees with Kant’s conception 
of the contract regulating sex to avoid immorality, denouncing the possibility to subject the body to a 
contractual exchange. Marriage may begin as a contract, but it transcends it immediately, because a 
contract only takes into account its individual members and not the unity that exists upon conclusion 
of the marriage.82 For Hegel, marriage is about the ethical bond, that subsists in ‘reciprocal love and 
support.’83 
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Marriage is further the first and constituting phase of completion of the family.84 Family is an 
element of ethical life, one of the interconnected social circles that enable man to fully realize 
himself, together with civil society and the state.85 It is thereby related to freedom and reason: we 
are free if our acts are guided by reason, but also when they are in accordance with our nature, that 
makes us part of a community at a certain place and time.86 Leading an ethical life means that we 
take up our social roles and duties that pertain to the ethical community and thus develop our 
personhood, a development Hegel qualifies as moving towards Mind or Spirit, or Geist.87 Beginning 
his development in the family, where man learns what it is to belong ‘to a non-contractual 
association’, man becomes fully realised in society with its institutions.88 Marriage is thus one of the 
institutions that plays an important role in the construction of identity of man, because we become 
ourselves in relation to others and because it is the locus of the physical realisation of potential in 
parenthood.89 It is, according to Hegel, also the main institution for woman, because she ‘has her 
substantive destiny in the family, and to imbued with family is her ethical frame of mind90. 
From the above, it is hard to imagine on what grounds Hegel would justify interference during 
marriage that goes beyond society’s role to recognize the unity by marriage. As the married couple is 
regarded as a single person, interfering in their relationship would be a violation of the unity. The 
unity exists as long as the marriage lasts.  
Although the couple are free to enter and terminate the marriage, Hegel is not a supporter of an easy 
divorce. He makes the leave dependent on permission of a third authority. Logically, this is also an 
ethical authority, because it has to decide on the dissolution of a unity that is characterised by an 
ethical bond. Divorce is granted when ‘the estrangement is total.’91 But divorce is not the only 
moment the unity dissolves: when children come of age, they are able to hold property themselves 
and the family’s role ends. Death is another instance.92 As a consequence of the dissolution, the 
members regain their independent status. The unity ceases to exist, whereby the right in the 
common stock will be transformed into a separately received share ‘by way of money, food, 
educational expenses and the like.’93 The reference to the role of marital arrangements in the event 
of a divorce94 demonstrates that the consequences of the divorce are not a community matter, but 
the responsibility of the parties that enter into marriage. I think that this means that the contract 
only has effect before conclusion or after dissolution of the marriage, because Hegel rejects legality 
in the unity during marriage. As Hegel does not consider marriage as a common contract and 
removes the unity itself from legal interference, I also take it that the matter of guilt or breach of 
contract is out of the equation.95  
In Hegel’s account of marriage and divorce, there is no reference to legal intervention that results in 
a prolongation of the bond that once was. After the dissolution of the unity and the division of 
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property, there is nothing left; this means that Hegel’s philosophy does not present a barrier to 
dissolubility but supports it, provided that it is granted by the ethical authority in case of divorce.  
3.4 Marriage and slavery – John Stuart Mill 
J.S. Mill (1806-1873) conveys a different idea of marriage and the position of women than Kant and 
Hegel, as he was more influenced by Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835).  
Von Humboldt argues generally for limited government interference, because this hinders man to 
realize himself socially and politically in society. In line with this he advocates a quite libertarian 
approach with regard to marriage. He regards it as an institution that one should be free to enter 
into and leave, stating that ‘the option of separation should always remain open, and the step itself 
should not require any extenuating reasons.’96 
In On Liberty (1859), Mill seems to go less far, although he cites Von Humboldt approvingly on 
engagements that involve personal relations:97 
…[which] should never be legally binding beyond a limited duration of time; and that the most 
important of these engagements, marriage, having the peculiarity that it objects are frustrated 
unless the feelings of both parties are in harmony with it, should require nothing more than the 
declared will of either party to dissolve it.  
However, Mill continues that the matter is complex, because moral obligations should be taken into 
account:98  
When a person, either by express promise or by conduct, has encouraged another to rely upon 
his continuing to act in a certain way – to build expectations and calculations, and stake any 
part of his plan of life upon that supposition – a new series of moral obligations arises on his 
part towards that person, which may possibly be overruled, but cannot be ignored. 
Maintaining that moral obligations would not prevent ultimate release from the fulfilment of the 
marriage contract, he also notes that obligations towards for example children must be honoured. 
Mill expresses the moral responsibility to allow ‘proper weight’ to the interests of the others 
involved.99 
The question is then, how and to which extent Mill actually allows government interference. Mill’s 
liberal and utilitarian view of society turned his attention towards the promotion of happiness for all, 
the prevention of harm and freedom. He allows intervention in that part of man’s life ‘which chiefly 
interests society.’100 As such public interests, Mill considers freedom, full development of man, health 
and equal rights for men and women.101 The justification for interference is that ‘everyone who 
receives the protection of society owes a return for the benefit, and the fact of living in society renders 
it indispensable that each should be bound to observe a certain line of conduct towards the rest.’102 
So, conduct may be regulated and remedies may be provided, especially when the rights and 
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interests of others in society are unjustly injured.103 Mill considers ‘conviction and persuasion’ and 
‘compulsion’ as effective means to influence or regulate behaviour.104 Persuasion can be used to 
nudge people in the direction of the perceived good. Some cases call for compulsion, such as for 
example slavery; a contract concerning slavery is forbidden.105 Mill considers this against the public 
interest, because it is not freedom ‘to be allowed to alienate his freedom.’106 He further distinguishes 
alienation from voluntary limitation, which is a quite normal feature of contracting: this is allowed. 
Other acts and their consequences, which only concern a person herself, should remain free from 
intervention.  
In The Subjection of Women (1869) he denounces the English marriage laws of the 19th century as 
particularly unjust. The absence of equality and subordination of women brings them in the position 
of slavery; actually even worse, as Roman slaves had more rights.107 He writes:108 
The disabilities, therefore, to which women are subject from the mere fact of their birth, are the 
solitary examples of the kind in modern legislation. In no instance except this, which 
comprehends half the human race, are the higher social functions closed against any one by a 
fatality of birth which no exertions, and no change of circumstances, can overcome.  
The social subordination of women thus stands out an isolated fact in modern social institutions 
(…); a single relic of an old world of thought and practice exploded in everything else, but retained 
in the one thing of most universal interest… 
Mill presents the subjection of women in marriage as ‘the positive evil caused to the disqualified half 
of the human race’, while rendering them free would only be beneficial to humankind and thus 
contribute to the happiness of all.109 For moral cultivation in daily life, it is necessary to render man 
and wife equal to make their relationship a just one.110 He compares marriage to a partnership in 
business and questions the necessity to name one of the partners head of the business.111 He also 
draws a parallel with friendship, considering a solid friendship as a good base for marriage:112  
…[comparing the sympathy and interest] between two friends of the same sex, who are much 
associated in their daily life: and it would be a common, if not the commonest, case in 
marriage, did not the totally different bringing-up of the two sexes make it next to an 
impossibility to form a really well-assorted union. 
Mill takes into account the perspective of women and identifies the oppression of women as the key 
problem for society’s development towards a public good. All government interference that blocks 
the development of a society towards that end, such as unjust marriage laws, lacks sufficient 
justification.  
 
103 Acts can be damaging, but this not always calls for action; healthy competition is no problem for Mill, only 
when it is accompanied by fraud, force or deceit, Mill, John Stuart (1859),  p. 170. 
104 Mill, John Stuart (1859), p. 136. 
105 Mill, John Stuart (1859), p. 183. 
106 Mill, John Stuart (1859), p. 184-185. 
107 Mill, John Stuart (1869), The Subjection of Women, London, Longmans, Green, Reader and Dyer, published 
at gutenberg.org., p. 57-59. 
108 Mill, John Stuart (1869), p. 36. 
109 Mill, John Stuart (1869), p. 188. 
110 Mill, John Stuart (1869), p. 79. 
111 Mill, John Stuart (1869), p. 71-72. 
112 Mill, John Stuart (1869), p. 173-174. 
19 
 
Against the backdrop of the 19th century English society and utilitarianism, Mill develops a modern 
view on marriage and divorce. His concept shows the effect of balancing the public interest against 
the private freedom of contract. He navigates between the liberal conceptions of freedom and 
autonomy and the more interventionist ideal of taking responsibility for the public good, including 
opposing oppression and supporting gender equality, steering away from the bodily and 
procreational aspect of marriage. Divorce is possible, although Mill suggests that the effects of 
marriage may last longer than marriage itself, because of the moral obligations that follow from it. 
Thus, from the utilitarian standpoint, some justification with reference to moral obligations and 
responsibilities could be given.  
3.5 Abolish the family – Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels 
Marx and Engels make a radical break with the ideas that marriage is a valuable institution in itself.  
Influenced by Hegel’s philosophy, the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution, including its 
effects on the working classes, Karl Marx (1818-1883) considers man as sociable by nature and 
historical in society. In The Communist Manifesto (1848), written by Marx and Engels together by 
order of the communist movement, they present the opposed interest between the proletariat, the 
class that only has children, and the bourgeoisie, the property owning class. The oppositional force 
between the two classes fuels the development of society towards its end. The role of history in their 
account emphasizes that there is no way back, just forward. Economic progress boosts the 
development of the bourgeoisie as the product ‘of a series of revolutions in the modes of production 
and of exchange’ and ‘a corresponding political advance of that class.’113  
Marx’s and Engels’ account of the family and its development through history is fairly naturalistic. 
They adopt the view that there has been a time where the family did not exist, that there were only 
relations evolving around sex, without taboos or difference with regard to the sexes. Only thereafter 
social groups were formed, and the family further evaluated as a property protecting structure, 
sustained by laws of marriage and inheritance, until it finally achieves the phase of the bourgeois 
family in the 19th century. Family is then reduced to a mere instrument in the dealings of the 
bourgeoisie: ‘the bourgeoisie has torn away from the family its sentimental veil, and has reduced the 
family relation to a mere money relation.’114 Against this setting, family is not a necessity, but a 
superfluous superstructure, on the same level as religion.115 The abolishment of private or bourgeois 
property, as well as bourgeois individuality, independence and freedom, result inevitably in 
abolishment of the family.116 All rights of inheritance should be abolished too.117 
One could argue against this view that the family plays a role in educating children. But Marx and 
Engels do not agree. The family is not needed for education of children. They want to replace home 
education by social education ‘to rescue education from the influence of the ruling class’, as well as 
‘do away with the status of women as mere instruments of production.’118 Couples can still exist, a 
mutual bond of love keeps them together.119   
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The above account contains a conception of the good where marriage and family are redundant. 
There is neither need nor ground for legislation, other than that which prevents ownership of private 
property. In 1917, the bolshevist government in Russia actually adopted laws that seemed to  
embody the spirit of the Manifesto. All religious forms of matrimony were immediately abolished 
and replaced by civil matrimony. Divorce was granted upon request and without further proceedings 
unless the other party did not agree. This exemption was abolished later, so that divorce was 
possible without civil intervention (by for example a postcard). Man and women were considered 
equal, before the law and with regard to the children. If a child was born outside marriage, the man 
could acknowledge the child. A few years later, cohabitation was even put on a par with marriage. 
But not all private property was abolished: after marrying, each spouse kept his or her own property, 
unless they chose to apply the limited communal property regime. Covenants were prohibited and 
post-marital support was only allowed in case of work disability and needy circumstances, up to the 
maximum of one year after the divorce.120  
Marx and Engels base the dissolubility, even redundancy, of marriage on their view of the role of 
property. If property is abolished, the rationale for marriage is also gone. Their view thus highlights a 
relation between marriage and property. This leaves a society in the phase before the classless 
society, where marriage still plays a role, without a theoretical framework to reconsider it. This is 
illustrated by the difference between the early bolshevic and Stalinist concepts of marriage. Stalin 
abolished all the reform and returned to the quite archaic laws; also the equation of matrimony with 
cohabitation was dismissed. As a result, the regulation of marriage may be disengaged from 
communism and become prone to an instrumentalist approach to consolidate power, as the events 
in the first half of the 20th century in Russia illustrate. 
3.6 The institution and the principles of justice 
3.6.1 The case for justice – John Rawls 
While Mill advocates the principle of the happiness of all, Marx and Engels focus on property, Rawls 
(1921-2002), not unlike Kant, chooses the angle of right by introducing his principles of justice as 
fairness (the Principles), which operate from the assumption of man’s wish for cooperation in a world 
where people are free and equal.121  
If society and its institutions, including the family,122 are constructed and behave in accordance with 
the Principles, they sustain well-ordered society and help achieve the common good:123  
A well-ordered society (corresponding to justice as fairness) is (…) a social union of social 
unions.(…) [T]he successful carrying out of just institutions is the shared final end of all the 
members of society, and these institutional forms are prized as good in themselves.  
Rawls regards the family as an example of a social union and an adequate way to educate children 
and reproduce society and its culture. Relationships that construct the family can be regarded as an 
 
120 Antokolskaia, Masha (2002), De ontwikkeling van het Russische familierecht vanaf de bolsjewistische 
revolutie: Een poging tot verklaring, Legal History Review 70, 1 and 2, p. 138-141. 
121 Gray, John Scott, (2004), Rawls's Principle of Justice as Fairness and Its Application to the Issue of Same-Sex 
Marriage, South African Journal of Philosophy 1, p. 163. 
122 Apparently Rawls previously added ‘monogamous,’ to abandon it later, Gray, John Scott, (2004), p. 165. 
123 Gray, John Scott, (2004), p. 161; Rawls, John (1971), A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, p. 462. 
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institutional form and prized good in themselves.124 Thus, the Principles should be applied to all 
decisions regarding institutions that concern family-forming relationships, including matrimony.125  
In A Theory of Justice (1971), Rawls articulates his Principles, including their ranking, as follows:126  
(i) each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties 
compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others [the equal liberty principle], and (ii) 
social and economic equalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably 
expected to be to everyone’s advantage [the equal opportunity principle], and (b) attached to 
positions and offices open to all [the difference principle].  
Rawls intends to overcome the difficulties of utilitarianism and disagreement on the concept of the 
good. He holds that ‘utilitarianism assumes some fairly accurate measure of utility… if we are to say 
that the gains of some are to outweigh the losses of others.’ Another disadvantage is, that it ‘may be 
based on ethical and other notions, not to mention bias and self-interest.’ He also questions ‘whether 
the total (or average) happiness is to be maximized in the first place.’127 Instead, Rawls proposes a 
process with a universal character to obtain decisions. Thus, he brings himself closer to Kant than to 
Mill: not the concept of the good is the guiding element of his philosophy, but the rights, to be 
secured by the Principles (as with Kant, the moral law is to be secured by the categorical imperative). 
Rawls states in this respect: ‘we should therefore reverse the relation between right and good 
proposed by teleological doctrines and view the right as prior.’128  
By means of a thought experiment, he explains how the Principles work. The idea is that rational 
deliberation about the basic structure of society should begin from an impartial point of view, the 
original position. The reasoning from an impartial position does not exclude a conception of the 
good, but prevents the preference for one in particular. The deliberating participants are well 
informed,129 but they do not know in what position they are: their particular positions are to be kept 
from them by a ‘veil of ignorance’.130 As a result, their reasoning dislodges from differences in for 
example gender, age, religion, wealth, origin and the particular conceptions of the good anyone 
supports. Rawls believes that in such a situation the participants, or representatives, guided by their 
innate sense of justice, would choose to apply the Principles and strike fair agreements.131 
Practical application of the principles will not lead to one, but many optimal situations, equally 
considered as a possible solution, as his reference to the Pareto criterion makes clear.132 Rawls’ end 
can thus be achieved in many ways.  
Matrimony distinguishes itself from other family forming relationship by the public recognition of the 
social union and the binding framework. It is one of the primary goods, even though it may not be 
the preference of everyone to enter into it. Application of the Principles does not prescribe a specific 
format of regulation, but brings to light which provisions of the mandatory framework that pose a 
barrier to dissolution of marriage may be unjust, because they are not in accordance with the 
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principle of equality, the principle of equal opportunity or the principle of difference, in that specific 
order.  
3.6.2 From impartiality to difference – Iris Marion Young 
The Principles are devised to have universal relevance independent of the specific politics of a 
society. Iris Marion Young (1949-2006) questions the value of the Principles and argues that they are 
not as universal as they seem to be, and imply a certain liberal or moral groundwork.133 She posits 
that it is not possible to estimate the appropriateness of the Principles theoretically: ‘The call ‘be just’ 
is always situated in concrete social and political practices’ and denies that it is possible to design a 
generally applicable system for a just society, that is based on universal norms that have no 
connection to real societies.134  
Young further argues that the ranking of the Principles shows a bias or preference for equality above 
opportunity and difference, and thus against correction or change. She does not endorse the 
important role of impartiality, because impartiality denies the difference and represses it, by keeping 
it from sight by the original position and the veil of ignorance.135 Instead, she puts emphasis on the 
relevance of groups as a whole. She argues ‘that where social group differences exist and some 
groups are privileged while others are oppressed, social justice requires explicitly acknowledging and 
attending to those group differences in order to undermine oppression.’136 In order to do so, it is 
necessary to abstract from individuals, but not from difference. Race, gender, age, wealth and 
physical (dis)abilities will then not be ignored, but be decisive in application of a certain politics.137 
From this perspective, she advocates a conception of justice that aims at undoing injustice, which is 
the result of domination and oppression. Therefore, institutions should not be governed by Principles 
or policies that support the ideal of impartiality by putting equality first.  
Young’s solution is a politics of difference (with particular rights and provisions for groups) which 
may override ‘a principle of equal treatment with the principle that group differences should be 
acknowledged in public policy and in the policies and procedures of economic institutions, in order to 
reduce actual or potential oppression.’138 The politics of difference should not be confused with 
Rawls’ difference principle, because the point of view varies: Young envisages the effect of politics on 
a specific group, while the principle of difference for Rawls pertains to (formal) accessibility of the 
institution for all. To those who would object that this would lead to stigmatization, Young holds that 
this only is because equality is identified with sameness and difference with deviance.139 Unequal 
cases may be treated differently, according to the circumstances. Matrimony could be regarded as 
the institution in particular that is tainted by injustice. According to De Beauvoir, it traditionally 
supports male dominance, by being one of the goals for man, but the primary goal for women. If this 
determines the perception of men and women, there may be formal equality and women may be 
given equal liberty and opportunity, but they would not be able or have learned how to capitalize on 
these. Taking into account Mill’s remark about the disabilities women are born with, equal rights do 
not affect the material inequality in position from which equal opportunity is a chimaera. Young 
notes that in marriage the labour division is usually inherently inequal. The resulting economic 
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dependence of women, which is set as example for the children, does not propagate equality or 
equal opportunity.140 The intrinsically inequal ordering of marriage will then be continued.141  
Application of the politics of difference demands specific assessment of the disadvantages that can 
be related to domination. In all previous views, except Mill’s, Marx’s and Rawls’, male dominance is 
explicitly endorsed. The disadvantages are also clear, in (for example) the enduring unequal division 
of labour and care, the economic dependence142 and inequal remuneration in society as of today. 
The different position of women in society calls for unequal treatment to overcome the inequality 
between the position of men and women as a result of previous domination. Because the politics 
focus on remedying the disadvantages for certain groups, government interference in the formerly 
hierarchically ordered institution of marriage would be justified to enhance the position of the 
vulnerable spouses. 
3.7 The ethics of care – From Mary Wollstonecraft to Fiona Robinson 
The Principles and politics focus on justice. Although justice is important, it is not the founding 
element of marriage and other relationships. Care ethics put emphasis on the fact that relationships, 
and thus society that is built on them, are more characterized by commitment and care than by 
universal justice. Care relations are shaped by general notions such as needs, interdependency and 
responsibility in human relations. This resonates with Hegel’s focus on the ethical community, the 
realm beyond contract, reciprocity and his rejection of the spirit of individualism.143 Several feminist 
thinkers, like Mary Wollstonecraft (1759 – 1797), draw attention to the aspect of care in human 
relationships. More recently Fiona Robinson even extends the scope of relations of care to societies 
as a whole.  
In valuing the nurturing activities, the perspective shifts from the institutions or groups in civic 
society to the spheres wherein relations of care occur, to begin with family relationships including 
marriage.144 Wollstonecraft attaches great importance to care giving duties in family relations, of 
both parents, and considers them as a founding element of society. In A Vindication of the Rights of 
Men (1790) and in A Vindication of the Rights of Women (1792), she advocates a just and caring 
society, denounces the unequal social relationships that corrupt civilization and stresses the 
importance of intimacy or friendship between parents for healthy child care.145 For intimacy and 
friendship, equality is necessary. In order to promote the kind of care that society benefits from, 
female care givers – in her time without civil and political rights - should be awarded equality and 
rights.146 She also argues for government intervention to enhance the possibilities for women to have 
a career and become economically independent from men.147 Not too concerned about practical 
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hindrances, she writes: ‘An active mind embraces the whole circle of its duties, and finds time 
enough.’148  
This approach affects the demarcation of the public interest. When family relations are equated with 
relations of care, and care relations in society are considered foundational, the result is that the 
private becomes political and the distinction between the private and the public sphere or interest 
vanishes.149 It is as Daniel Engster summarizes: Wollstonecraft approaches ‘the whole issue of 
governance from a care perspective, reformulating classical liberal theory to emphasize the 
importance of the family and nurturing relationships for the well-being of society at large.’150 For this 
well-being, public recognition of care-giving activities for society is of main importance,151 because 
otherwise the healthy delivery of care in society comes under pressure.152 This not only goes for 
caring duties of mothers, but of fathers alike: ‘To render mankind more virtuous, and happier of 
course, both sexes must act from the same principle.153 Government’s role is to support the strive for 
equality by protecting the weak.154 Thus justice serves the purpose of care; both concepts are 
fundamentally related. 
Fiona Robinson agrees with Wollstonecraft that ‘relations of care are the basis of all social life.’155 She 
puts emphasis on the importance of the ethics of care to assess social arrangements and human 
relationships: ‘relations and practices of care and responsibility are the basic structure of morality 
and […] a central feature of all human life.’156 Furthermore, adequate and non-exploitative care 
reduces the risks of security threats.157 Undervaluation of care may discourage care and lead to 
neglect, which may affect society adversely at large. Especially when combined with a labour and 
care division according to particular patterns of for example gender, it constitutes a security risk. The 
reference to undervaluation reminds of Hegel’s concept of recognition: man strives and struggles for 
recognition in the ethical community and the denial of reciprocal recognition, including care, can lead 
to isolation and alienation.158 Another parallel is the idea that relations of care in society (the ethical 
community) are an extension of the relations of care in the family (the ethical bond or love). 
Robinson argues, not completely in tune with Wollstonecraft, that the ethics of care and the rights-
based justice ethics, inspired by Kant, are more or less juxtaposed instead of intrinsically connected, 
because care is fundamental and the basis ‘upon which other moral concepts are supported.’159 
Finally, she concludes that  
Liberalism’s emphasis on autonomy, individual rights, and formal-legal equality depends upon 
the feminization and privatization of care work;’ as Baier explains, as long as women could be 
convinced to assume responsibility for the care of home and children, the liberal morality could 
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continue to be the official morality, by turning its eyes away from the contribution made by 
those it excluded (1995: 25).160 
Care is for Wollstonecraft and Robinson the basis of social life. Its valuation and the related duties 
between spouses or of parents towards their children may provide justification for government 
interference in relationships and practices of care, in order to prevent undervaluation of care and 
thus produce a healthy delivery of care. 
3.8 Conclusion 
In most philosophical thoughts, the procreational or educational aspects of the family are mentioned 
and valued as public interests. But with regard to the property aspects and effects of marriage, the 
public interest is less clear. Some views express an explicit preference for marital arrangements 
without governmental interference, while others put more emphasis on the common property and 
patriarchal control or even the abolishment of the possibility of matrimonial transfer. In the modern 
views (20th century), the focus shifts. Emphasis is laid on generally applicable Principles of justice or 
politics that operate as a process to endeavour social justice in general or an ethics of care that is 
characterized by the value attached to duties and relations of care and social interdependency. This 
chapter served to present different views, to enable assessment in the next chapter. 
 
160 Robinson, Fiona (2011), p. 162, with reference to Baier, Annette (1995), Moral Prejudices: Essays on Ethics, 
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 4 What justifies and challenges the barriers to dissolubility of marriage? 
In the previous chapter, several arguments were presented supporting and against government 
interference in marriage and/or its dissolution. Would any of them, alone or combined, be sufficient 
justification for government interference in marriage? Or would they justify further restriction or 
extension of interference? I will narrow down the views that may offer sufficient grounds, by 
eliminating the views that provide problematic criteria. In the assessment I will make a distinction 
between the formal and material aspects of dissolution. At first I will elaborate on the thresholds and 
barriers in the (formal) process of dissolution, and after that on the (material) extension of 
obligations between spouses after dissolution. 
4.1 Previously: religious views 
The Roman Catholic view, as other religious views, offers only sufficient justification in legal 
interference in marriage and its dissolution for those that subscribe to the theology of the Church. 
This also holds for other religious views. If we look for a groundwork in a secular society, it is not 
possible to find it in the divine law, as the divine law and its interpretations operate outside its realm. 
Since the secular society is one of the underlying assumptions of this thesis, the religious views 
cannot provide a basis for legal interference with regard to the conclusion and content of marriage 
and its dissolution. 
4.2 Formal aspects: legal intervention and the ethical authority 
Before discussing the arguments with regard to the legal framework that focus on material aspects of 
marriage, I will turn to the justification of legal intervention upon the dissolution or divorce itself. I 
will argue that legal intervention that hinders the process of dissolution may only be justified to a 
limited extent. Counterarguments will be indicated by indents. 
1. Hegel argues that an ethical authority should intervene in order to grant the divorce. It would be 
logical to assume that Hegel’s ethical authority is related to the expressive aspect of matrimony, 
with its two dimensions: recognition by the couple and by society at the wedding. Because the 
love departs without ceremony, a separate moment to confirm this event would be necessary to 
manifest the divorce for the community. The ethical authority accommodates this and restores 
the symmetry. If the above describes the role of the ethical authority accurately, Hegel’s 
reasoning may also serve to justify the intervention upon the divorce in general, because it 
concerns the expressive element as main feature of marriage, regardless of whether one supports 
the rest of his philosophy. Nowadays the court functions as the third party that represents the 
community upon divorce. Thus, Hegel’s view seems to support the legal intervention of the court 
as a third party representing society, whose recognition once was sought and is needed to undo 
the recognition.  
Nowadays, the ground for divorce is irretrievable breakdown. In case parties agree on this, 
there is no further assessment of this by the court, but still court intervention is deemed 
necessary. In case of consensus, the registered partnership, that shares all features with 
marriage, including its expressive aspect, can be dissolved outside court, by submitting the 
agreement to the civil registry. There was support for a change of the Law that would allow to 
divorce outside court, but it did not make it.161 The main reason was the risk that the parties 
 
161 The formal requirements for such a divorce were less than the requirements for dissolution of the registered 
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would not be able to assess the consequences of divorce, the lack of expertise of the official 
and the protection of the most vulnerable spouse. But this also applies to the relationship of 
registered partners who can dissolve the partnership outside court. The intervention of the 
court is not only not required to effect divorce in case of consensus, but it also leads to 
unequal treatment in similar cases, thus imposing an unjustified barrier in the process of 
dissolution.  
2. Court intervention may be justified in so far as it endeavours the fulfilment of parental duties of 
care. The current law requires that parents submit a parenting plan162 with the petition to divorce, 
or dissolution in case of the registered partnership. It presupposes that parents enter into 
negotiation over the division of their responsibilities towards the minor children. For Locke, this 
would perfectly reflect and be justified by the purpose of matrimony and therefore the minimum 
bar for intervention is met. It also concords with the central concept of care of the ethics of care.  
 
Against this may be argued that the parenting plan is no requirement in case of a breakup 
outside marriage. The effect is that married and unmarried couples with minor children are 
not treated equally, although the circumstances are similar. This would infringe on the 
Principles of justice, such as the principal of equality, without sufficient justification.  
 
This counterargument does not hold. The parenting plan serves as an example how 
parents should handle their parental obligations in case of a breakup. The fact that not 
all parents actually have to make a parenting plan, does not invalidate the justification in 
a limited number of cases. The duties of care are most important and would even justify 
extension of the obligation to make such a plan to parents that break up a free union. 
Because care and responsibility are foundational and justice merely serves the purpose 
of care, the duties of care can override the principle of equality and the obligatory 
parenting plan is justifiable to support proper valuation of the duties of care.  
The incentive to consider the parental duties of care, also after divorce, is the rationale for the 
parenting plan. Although it may be considered as a delay to the process, it is justified. Locke would 
allow it because of its relation with the purpose of marriage. The ethics of care provide another 
argument, because of the utmost importance and foundational character of the duties of care.  
Further barriers to dissolution should be limited. Some intervention of society, by offering a way to 
legalize divorce and undo the recognition, may be sufficiently justified, as is the offering of dispute 
resolution. But it does not sufficiently explain why the expressive aspect has to be undone by 
involving obligatory court assessment in case there is consensus, while in such cases marriage’s twin 
sister, the registered partnership, can be dissolved by mutual agreement outside court. 
4.3 Material aspects of the dissolution of marriage  
4.3.1 Natural law and the procreational aspects 
After discussing the justification of legal intervention as a formal barrier to dissolution of the 
marriage, I will now enter into grounds for (partial) indissolubility of marriage in itself. In the natural 
law tradition, man’s nature and the direct focus on procreational interests of society are offered as 
 
partnerschap door de ambtenaar van de burgerlijke stand (Wet scheiden zonder rechter), withdrawn by letter 
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parental duties after the divorce. The arrangements are stipulated in the parenting plan. 
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the major rationale for marriage and its regulation, including possible indissolubility. The 
combination, however, is dubious because there is no need to combine procreational aspects with 
marriage or its indissolubility, for several reasons.  
1. Children are born in and outside marriage. Today even, most eldest children are born outside 
marriage. In our society, marriage’s moral purpose to save women and children from ‘falling from 
grace’ seems to have vanished: people take a neutral or favourable attitude towards the fact that 
many children are born and raised in cohabitation instead of marriage.163 They merely find the 
growing number of one parent families worrisome, which may be related to individualistic 
tendencies in society.164 Therefore, if marriage is not necessary to serve the interest of 
procreation and subsistence of society, these interests cannot be presented as justification to 
prevent its dissolution.  
 
2. Further, it seems that the defenders of natural law take an unnecessary detour. Their (implicit) 
hypothesis is that the regulation and promotion of marriage provides a necessary and preferred 
protection for the procreational interest and subsistence of society. However, it is not clear at all 
whether is the best option to protect procreational interests or contribute or nudge people in a 
desirable direction. Protection, directly oriented at children and their education, is more efficient 
and effective to serve these interests. This is what actually happens now, by general provisions 
regulating education, public assistance, tax benefits and protection and addressing the parent(s), 
schools and other institutions in society. These measures have a broad scope and affect all 
children in society, regardless of their situation, whether they are born in or outside marriage. The 
hypothesis that exclusively and preferably relates the procreational interest to the necessity of 
marriage and its (partial) indissolubility is therefore not sustainable. 
 
3. Nowadays, the provisions that prevent complete dissolubility of marriage are not connected with 
the procreational interests, but with property, liability and responsibility of the spouses for their 
mutual welfare after divorce. The prolonged responsibilities with respect to children are not 
connected with marriage, but with parenthood.  
The argument, that the procreational aspects require government interference in marriage, resulting 
in its (partial) indissolubility, seems insufficiently substantiated. The argument presumes a necessary 
relation between procreation and marriage that is not existent, as procreation exists outside 
marriage, can be protected outside marriage and the current regulation seems merely related to 
property effects and responsibility for the other spouse. These counterarguments are basically 
present in the views of Locke, Marx and Engels.  
4.3.2 Morality and the conception of the good 
Matrimony may not be a procreational necessity, but it may be in the interest of society and its 
subsistence to promote social unions and families by interference in marriage. The direct focus on 
reproduction then shifts to the focus on matrimony as the preferred context to associate and foster 
bonds. This idea can be found in the views of Locke, Kant, Hegel and Rawls. I will argue that any 
valued or preferred position of matrimony, from a moral standpoint, does not sufficiently support its 
binding legal framework and indissolubility, for the following reasons.  
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1. Kant sees marriage as the only institution, governed by the state, that can elevate sexuality out of 
immorality. Marriage opens up to rights and to reciprocal possession of bodies; it even allows to 
return the other’s body by force.165 This explanation of marriage as an institution revolving around 
bodies and right is an issue, as it fails to appreciate what marriage is about. Marriage is not about 
bodies and rights, but about commitment and responsibility, thus about behaviour. Kant’s view 
even provides justification for the use of force or holding the other against his or her will; as a 
result, it is not clear whether the moral law is still applicable in marriage and to what it applies. 
Does it apply to acts or bodies? If it applies to the body, it does not seem that the other is then 
considered as an end in itself, but just as a mean to restore bodily possession. If it apples to acts, 
then it would lead to the strange result that it is not considered immoral for one spouse to hold 
the other hostage. Also, it is difficult to understand why sexuality is immoral by definition and why 
a sexual relationship between an man and a woman outside marriage is to be considered as a 
surrender of the woman to the man. Taking into account Kant’s categorical imperative, any 
behaviour, not just sexual behaviour, can be immoral, if the moral law is not observed. Why is 
sexual behaviour different? It seems to depend on how sexuality is looked at. If we suppose 
sexuality involves mutual surrender, would it then still be immoral (by definition) in Kant’s view? I 
doubt this. And if all obligations of care are met, outside marriage, what is the origin of the 
immorality? If Kant means that it is because of the perceived inequality between men and 
women, this also does not sufficiently clarify the need for government interference: Kant equates 
difference with inequality and does not justify his view on the inequality of man and women. 
Besides, inequal relations do not necessarily lead to immorality, as we can see with parents and 
children. Kant’s account of marriage raises more questions than it provides answers. Therefore, it 
does not sufficiently support a justification for government interference in marriage and its 
indissolubility.  
 
2. Hegel’s morally charged view of marriage could serve as another counterargument to Kant 
because it supports dissolubility after the ethical bond has perished. The argument against the 
prolonged effects of marriage is connected with the nature of ethical love, which is the bond that 
creates the family. When the ethical love between the spouses is gone, divorce is the logical 
result: without the ethical love, the mutual commitment to become a unity, which is the raison 
d’être for the unity, has fallen away. Without the unity there is nothing to base any prolonged 
effect on.  
 
3. Mill’s view, in as far as he seems to support indissolubility, can also be countered, because he 
does not give decisive arguments in favour or against indissolubility. He allows divorce, but also 
notes the prolonged responsibilities resulting from expectations and moral obligations. Against 
the background of the utilitarian and the ‘no harm’ principles, he expresses the possibility for 
society to interfere, in the public interest, using persuasion or compulsion. A legal framework with 
regard to marriage, that would point at the moral obligations and responsibilities, would probably 
be supported by Mill. But his principles do not give guidance about the extent to which 
interference is allowed: a nudging non mandatory framework could be defended as easily as a 
mandatory framework. The problems with the utilitarian principles, also noted by Rawls, make 
them unsuitable to function as proper and solid foundation for the indissolubility of marriage. 
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4.3.3 Consent and the freedom of contract 
In this paragraph I will assess the arguments from the point of view that government interference 
needs justification, because it is an exemption to, or overrides, the generally applicable freedom of 
contract. 
1. In our society, the freedom of contract with regard to property arrangements is respected. 
Cohabitants are free to shape their arrangements, without any mandatory regulation other than 
the civil code. It seems that couples have the choice between either complete freedom to design 
the terms of their arrangement outside marriage, or limited freedom of contract in marriage. In 
addition to that, if the couple want to marry, there is no possibility to escape the mandatory 
framework, with significant property effects. Although property is often explicitly linked to 
marriage, this does not justify interference. Property is linked to all institutions in society, because 
property relations belong to the basic structure of society. What would then basically justify the 
different treatment with respect to property and the limitation of the freedom of contract? 
Interference by mandatory laws with an indissoluble character in relation to property effects, 
such as liabilities or maintenance, would go beyond the maximum bar set by Locke, as it infringes 
on the freedom of contract and constitutes unequal treatment in similar circumstances, without 
sufficient justification.  
But Locke also accepts government interference as a restriction to the freedom of contract. He 
holds that marriage is for a purpose (raising the offspring). It may be that dissolubility after 
fulfilment of the purpose is allowed, but before the completion of the task, it may be an issue, 
because that would violate the purpose of marriage. In that case Locke allows for intervention. 
Mill reasons similarly; the ‘no harm’ principle could lead to a situation where prolonged 
responsibility after dissolution of the marriage may result from expectations or moral 
obligations, especially towards those in dependent relations. Interference would be justified 
because of this, to safeguard the raising of the offspring and to prevent that the moral 
obligations would be ignored at the expense of the most vulnerable party. 
2. Another argument in favour of the dissolubility of marriage can be derived from Locke’s liberal 
philosophy and Von Humboldt’s libertarian position towards marriage. The view of marriage as a 
contract incited Locke consider the consent to marriage not to be for life, but for a certain 
purpose. If the purpose, or the commitment to each other, is gone, the marriage can be dissolved, 
on the parties’ own terms.  
The arguments in favour of and against freedom of contract, substantiate the view that special 
obligations or responsibilities may override the general freedom of contract. In that case, 
interference that prevents (complete) dissolubility could be sufficiently justified. Beyond these there 
is no sufficient justification for interference. 
4.3.4 The Principles of justice as fairness, the politics of difference and the ethics of care 
Several arguments above refer to equality or equal treatment. This principle plays an important role 
in the Principles of justice and there seems broad consensus over the general value of it. In the next 
arguments I will assess the justifying power of the Principles of justice, Young’s politics of difference 
and care ethics.  
1. In concrete cases, the Principles may render an approach to assess whether the rules pertaining 
to matrimony are just. The process of rational deliberation that involves the application of the 
Principles, shows that some current provisions of Netherlands marital law, that prolong the 
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effects of marriage beyond it, are not in accordance with the Principles, see the examples in the 
Annex.166 Therefore, indissolubility is not sufficiently justified. 
 
This outcome does not mean that indissolubility fundamentally infringes on the Principles, in 
other words, it does not exclude that indissolubility may be in accordance with the Principles. 
As far as Rawls is concerned, mandatory laws that include (partial) indissolubility would be 
allowed, if the possible outcome meets the Pareto criterion.167 Therefore, it is very difficult, or 
even impossible, to derive a general argument not only in favour but also against 
indissolubility of marriage from the Principles. 
 
Against this, one could argue that the mandatory framework of marriage, including its 
indissolubility, actually is unjust, because it affects the liberty to choose for marriage 
negatively. The necessity to accept (for example) latent obligations regarding debts may 
block (a member of) the couple, making the specific form of recognition that pertains to 
marriage no longer an opportunity that is available to the other, or in general, those 
who prefer it. Such an exception to the liberty principle, that reminds of the freedom of 
contract, needs proper justification. 
 
2. (Partial) indissolubility may be justified by a politics of difference. The Principles do not allow for a 
fair process or adequate means to establish justice, because the primary focus on equality hinders 
justice. To undo the effects of (previous) domination or oppression, it may be necessary to let the 
principle of equality give way to a politics of difference, that could even support (partial) 
indissolubility. Marriage itself may be the issue, if it is considered as an institution that 
perpetuates or condones dependence of especially women as a consequence of its relation with 
male dominance (in the past). An indication for this is the loss in wealth or income after divorce, 
especially for women.168 Their lower income or earning capacity may be related either to the 
traditional unequal division of labour and care, that affects the opportunities to develop their 
earning capacity negatively, or to general tendencies in society, to remunerate women less than 
men. As women belong to a group that still experience the detrimental effects of the hierarchical 
structure of marriage and male dominance, their less favourable position after dissolution should 
be compensated, by a mandatory framework including partial indissolubility. 
 
Against this could be brought that women do not form a homogenous group, as a lot of 
women do not experience the detrimental consequences. Application of the politics calls at 
least for a demarcation of the groups that are actually affected by the difference, for example 
by distinguishing women according to life choices (children/care).  
 
3. Partial indissolubility may also be grounded on an ethics of care. In ethics of care, care is 
prioritised over justice as main point of focus. Justice is intrinsically connected with care, but not 
foundational for it. The valuation of care in relationships, such as the family and marriage where 
care is produced and reproduced, should therefore be of main concern. Marriage is the institution 
that represents a special and explicit commitment, a bond of that revolves around mutual care 
and responsibility in daily life; it creates expectations, that may guide certain life choices. 
 
166 In this Annex, I assess the concordance of the provisions regarding joint liability for certain debts and 
maintenance with the Principles. 
167 Rawls, John (1971), p. 58-64. 
168 The loss for men is 0,2%, against the loss for women of 25%, Van den Brakel, Marion, Arts, Koos, (2017),  p. 
11.  
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Undervaluation of care needs to be avoided, because it poses a risk to society. A breakup of a 
relationship often brings these risks to light, especially when one of the partners finds themselves 
in a vulnerable position with less income. This may threaten one’s subsistence and adversely 
affect the continuation of the duties of care with respect to, for example, children. Therefore, 
family members, whether it concerns partners, spouses or parents, should be encouraged to fulfil 
their duties of care. The solidarity and care in the past, with its consequences through time, 
should be acknowledged. This may call for government interference and restriction of the 
freedom of contract, as a way to oblige the couple to prolong the care for the other to a certain 
extent. 
 
Against this could be argued that the care for children is not the issue here, as the parents 
are obliged to take care of their children, in and outside marriage, and even support the 
other parent to do so. Thus, parental obligations do not affect the dissolubility of marriage or 
registered partnerships. The mandatory partner alimony, however, does; it poses a barrier to 
complete dissolubility, which is not in the interest of society, that endeavours self- 
supportiveness. It elevates the standard of living of the ex-spouse to a level that cannot be 
reached by him- or herself, thus fostering dependency and discouraging the ex-partner to 
find ways to become self-supporting. Both spouses should invest in or maintain their abilities 
to be self-supporting during marriage and to become less vulnerable in case the future does 
not evolve as expected. Also, if alimony is not agreed upon in amicable settlement, it may 
fuel feelings of resentment between the parents, that could be detrimental to children. The 
mandatory alimony provisions also present an unjustified difference in treatment for couples 
in and outside marriage. Therefore, extension of support is not in the interest of society and 
the ethics of care cannot justify any obligation to support the ex-partner. 
 
Against this could be argued that the counterargument denies the aspect of care in 
matrimony and the freedom of spouses to agree to the division of care and labour that 
suits them during their marriage, even if this causes dependency and prevents 
development of self-supportiveness. In case the couple no longer support the bond for 
the future, it does not mean that the commitment and dependency from the past 
disappears. Care would be undervalued if the responsibility would end abruptly, 
especially if the consequences of the care related decisions that were made during 
marriage benefitted one of the spouses and were detrimental to the other. The former 
commitment and care justifies an obligation for spouses to continue their care after 
divorce, to give each other time and resources to adjust to the new situation.  
The freedom of contract and the Principles, that emphasize the equality between men and women, 
could ignore the effects of the (previous) hierarchy, that cause a difference in position and 
dependence to the disadvantage of women. The unjust consequences of the Principles are taken into 
account by the politics of difference. Ethics of care also provide arguments to override the Principles, 
on other grounds, mainly because care is foundational for society and justice is not. The importance 
for society to foster relations of care, such as the marital bond, suffice to justify governmental 
interference, which overrules the freedom of contract. This may result in indissolubility of marriage 
to a certain extent, by imposing care duties to compensate for disadvantages or to allow adjustment 
to the new situation. 
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5 Conclusion 
1. The main features present in marriage are (i) the couple’s voluntary and (ii) public expression of (iii) 
consent to a union that represents mutual commitment and loyalty. Two other features are (iv) 
acceptance of a (possibly partly unknown) framework of mandatory laws (v) which even binds after 
dissolution of the marriage by – for example - divorce. This thesis’ focus is on the question whether 
government interference that results in the mandatory framework that extends its effects to and 
beyond dissolution is sufficiently justified.  
2. Government interference is justified within boundaries. These are most clearly set by Locke. There 
should at least be an end of the state that serves the interference, such as the protection of 
property, by offering general dispute resolution. But interference should not go beyond its purpose, 
otherwise it would constitute an unjustified infringement upon the liberty of man. 
3. Some intervention of society in the process of dissolution, by offering an obligatory procedure to 
legalize divorce and undo the recognition of the mutual commitment by society, may be sufficiently 
justified. But it does not sufficiently explain the necessity of a court intervention in cases where there 
is no room for court assessment because the couple have reached consensus about the 
consequences of the divorce. In this respect, marriage, in all other aspects similar to registered 
partnership, is treated differently without a clear justification.   
There is, however, an exception, also applicable to registered partnerships, that may be justified by 
reference to Locke or the ethics of care. According to Locke, matrimony is a special purpose contract, 
that serves the raising of children. Although he advocates the possibility of divorce after marriage has 
fulfilled its purpose, he also argues that government interference is justified in the event the purpose 
of matrimony is violated. A breakup may put this upbringing at risk, in which case the freedom of 
contract may be overridden, by imposing court intervention. Applying the ethics of care may lead to 
the same result. The ethics of care insist that society is held together by practices and relations of 
care, such as the relation between parents and children. Their undervaluation may discourage care 
or even induce neglect and thus pose a security risk to society. Therefore, the fostering of parental 
duties of care are included in the public interest. In both accounts, legal intervention is then justified 
if it incites parents to reflect and agree on the fulfilment of their parental duties after divorce.  
4. Material barriers to complete dissolution of marriage cannot be justified by reference to the 
relation between marriage and procreational aspects and procreation as a necessity to subsistence of 
society. Moral laws cannot substantiate indissolubility. Arguments that take into account the liberty 
of man support the freedom of contract in marriage and favour the dissolubility of marriage in case 
the couple no longer desire to be married: the property effects of dissolution, as belonging to the 
substructure of society, do not require special attention that justifies interference. Also, the 
application of the Principles of justice as fairness indicate that current marital law impinges on them. 
The mandatory aspects of marital law, that pertain to property effects and even extend beyond 
marriage, should be lifted, not only because of violation of the freedom of contract but also because 
they infringe on the Principles and thus lack proper justification.  
The freedom of contract would not prevent the right of government to nudge into a preferred 
direction or to propagate stable relationships, including taking responsibility for mutual care. This is 
possible by offering a non-binding framework of law, as a default position that could be deviated 
from by contract, not depending on marital status. In that case interference would not pose a 
problem, as the freedom of contract is respected. 
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However, as with regard to the procedures, several arguments support that the freedom of contract 
should give way to other interests. The end of matrimony, as Locke puts it, may allow for 
interference and even indissolubility, if its purpose is violated. This purpose is related to the raising of 
children. Mill too, points at responsibilities and moral obligations that must be honoured beyond the 
marriage. The ethics of care seem to follow up on these arguments. To foster relations of care is an 
interest of society, as they form the basis that holds society together. Undervaluation of care may 
pose a risk to security. Thus, denying the consent to commitment and loyalty, the previous division of 
care and the detrimental effects of it in marital relations may be understood as examples of 
undervaluation of care. Interference is justified to impose obligations on former spouses to continue 
care to a certain extent. Further, principles of justice, including those of equal liberty, ignore the 
effects of the (previous) hierarchy and male dominance and the resulting difference in position and 
dependency to the disadvantage of women. After demarcation of the group that is still adversely 
affected, interference that remedies the disadvantages, such as for example with regard to 
maintenance, would also be justified.  
5. The hypothesis stands partially, because without a sufficient reason for interference, the freedom 
of contract prevails, as with cohabitants. In general, the regime may be a non-binding regime as 
default option. However, there is an important caveat to this: both a politics of difference and the 
ethics of care may justify interference, because of the priority of the remedy of previous injustice and 
the founding principle of care.  
The above requires change of the current law, for example by (i) making available divorce upon 
agreement outside court, as with registered partnerships, (ii) lifting the mandatory provisions 
relating to the necessity of property arrangements, (iii) abolishing the joint liability for household 
debts and by (iv) reformulating the basis for partner alimony by reference not only to solidarity, 
which is similar to care, but also to the remedy of disadvantages, such as those pertaining to an 
unequal division of care.  
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Annex – Application of the Principles 
Example 1 – Joint liability for household debts 
The abolition of the joint liability for household debts has been subject to parliamentary debate in 
2000.169 The provision creates an extra liability for the spouse for household debts incurred by the 
other spouse. This results in advantages for third parties/household-creditors, even when the not-
contracting spouse cannot benefit from the contract. The provision is a relic from the patriarchal 
organized society, dating back from the era that the wife was legally incapacitated. It was then meant 
to protect creditors that were without recourse against the husband, in the event they had only 
contracted with the wife. One of the underlying reasons for the proposal to abolish the joint liability, 
was the unjustified difference in treatment of debtors and creditors.  
Resistance against abolishment came from the liberal party, disinclined to diminish the economically 
valued protection of creditors, and the religious parties, who emphasized the special responsibilities 
between spouses. Eventually the provision has not been abolished.  
When we apply the Principles, the rational deliberation process should not be based on values, but 
on a concept of right:  
1. The equal liberty principle: Generally citizens are only bound by the contracts they enter into 
themselves; joint liability is an exception to that rule. It offers unmarried citizens more liberty 
(protection from unknown creditors) than married couples. Thus the provision infringes on 
the equal liberty principle. But against this could be brought that the couple are free to 
choose the extended liability: if they do not marry, they do not have to accept it. Is this 
argument valid? I do not think so, because they cannot marry and at the same time avoid the 
joint liability. Effectively, the joint liability functions as a barrier. 
2. The equal opportunity principle: further, the reasoning of the liberal party defends an 
economic privilege that is no longer justified, because the circumstances have changed. The 
wife is no longer incapacitated. The once less favourable position of household creditors no 
longer exists. Instead they find themselves in a preferred position, without underlying 
reason. In addition, this arrangement is not to everyone’s advantage; not for all non-
contracting spouses and not for their other creditors. The provision also infringes on the 
opportunity principle.  
3. The difference principle: the provision is attached to marriage, so the preferred position is 
only available to creditors who deal with married couples, not open to all. The creditor may 
not even know whether the debtor is married or not. In that case it does not even play a role 
for the creditor. The provision also infringes on the difference principle.  
4. The reasoning of the religious parties refer to further unsubstantiated ‘special 
responsibilities’. It is quite difficult to see how these special responsibilities translate in 
special rights for certain creditors.  
Example 2 - Maintenance 
After divorce, the most affluent partner may be under obligation to pay maintenance. The obligation 
thereto only applies to the married couple, mandatory, while the unmarried couple have the free 
 
169 Artt. 1:85 en 1:86 BW, Kamerstukken 27.084 (2000/2001), https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-
27084-4.html. 
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choice to insert it in their agreements or not, however without the full benefit of the favourable tax 
regime.170  
1. The equal liberty principle: the mere fact that alimony after divorce is only obligatory after 
divorce and treated differently from alimony paid by ex-cohabitants, means unequal 
treatment of cohabitation and marriage and leads to unequal distribution of tax benefits. The 
government interference in the property effects of marriage seems an example of might is 
right: because marriage is a clear and distinguishable institution, a binding framework can be 
attached, which is more difficult in case of cohabitation. This constitutes an infringement of 
this principle. It cannot be the outcome of a process of rational deliberation on the concept 
of right, because it is only based on the value that is attached to marriage as institution in 
comparison with cohabitation. The impartial position prevents that such values play a role.  
2. The equal opportunity principle: the alimony obligation may be considered to be ‘aimed at 
maximizing the long-term expectations of the least advantaged.’171 If we consider that 
women suffer a loss in income after divorce that is generally 25 times bigger than the loss 
men suffer,172 it could be beneficial to them as least advantaged. But could it also be 
expected to be to everyone’s advantage? The obligation does not favour the spouses who 
have to pay, nor society if the costs of (continuous) legal intervention and collection are 
passed on to society. There may also be other burdens related to disputes over the 
obligation, such as incurred health costs and disrupted families. The unequal treatment in tax 
further reduces public tax income, from which only those who pay alimony benefit. So the 
benefit for society is at least questionable.  
3. The difference principle: is matrimony and the right or obligation to maintenance open to all? 
Not if the other member of the couple withholds his consent to marriages and prefers, 
maybe because of the obligations attached to marriage, another format for the relationship.  
 
170 Allegedly justified because of the risk of abuse, ECLI:NL:HR:2008:BD0181. 
171 Rawls, John, (1971),  p. 175. 
172 The loss for men is 0,2%, against the loss for women of 25%, Van den Brakel, Marion, Arts, Koos, (2017),  p. 
11.  
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